| Starr Piano vs. The Victor Company |
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Perhaps no industry has been more fraught with patent problems and legal
thickets than the recording industry. It began from its infancy, when Thomas
Edison secured several patents for his cylinder system, dominating the early
days while being challenged for business by, among others, Columbia. The
fledgling Victor Company, however, chose to produce flat disc records, using a
"lateral" method of recording original sound, and a corresponding means of
reproducing the sound through the phonographs they produced. The flat disc,
being easy to produce in quantity, quickly gained a large market share, but
Edison, which followed suit with its "Diamond Disc" product, was able to
demonstrate via "tone tests" that when played on Edison machines, their records
provided superior sound. This was largely a result of having a patented formula
covering the hard, button-like surface of Edison records, resistant to wear; and
a diamond stylus, equally resistant to wear and distortion, for playback.
Edison's patents on, and reliance on, the so-called "hill and dale" method of recording was eventually superceded by the "lateral" method championed by Victor. This company had thought the process had been covered by a patent issued to an individual named Jones, whom they bought out. Columbia, by now into flat disc production, was a competitor of strength, but an agreement between the two companies produced a combine that extracted licensing fees from all others seeking to produce lateral recordings. Starr, along with several other smaller recording companies, would produce vertical ("hill and dale") recordings for a time after entering the field via the manufacture of phonograph cabinets and players. They offered, as did some of the others, a dual-head tone arm that would play both types of commercial records. But they were unwilling to go along with the licensing fees demanded by Victor, backed up by their supposed patent and powerful legal threats that had dissuaded previous attempts to avoid payments of fees by other small producers. Starr was determined to get into lateral recording exclusively, and in mid-1919, issued its first products, accompanied by a strong advertising campaign claiming that these records would make any phonograph sound better. No fees were paid to Victor, and the fat was in the fire. Victor began a suit against Starr in federal court, charging patent infringement. Starr was by no means alone against the industry giant. The Richmond firm was defending on behalf of several other independents, among them Aeolian-Vocalion, OKEH, and the Canadian Compo. Victor, for its part, was confidently expecting a quick settlement in its favor, having won repeated court cases involving its patent ownerships on lateral methods. Some of these rulings had been based on patents that Victor claimed had been issued to them as late as 1905, four years after the original Jones patent. The picture was confused by murky, seemingly contradictory, rulings too convoluted to describe here. Suffice it to say that all this would work in Starr's favor, placing in some doubt the value of precedent decisions. In addition, Starr, a prosperous piano manufacturer, had the financial resources to carry on a protracted defense. And they would need it. The case was in court for many months, involving technical demonstrations and national and international patent matters. In February of 1921, United States District Court Judge Learned Hand, who would become a legend in his own lifetime, issued a decision that favored Starr and its fellow independents. Some of the patents on which Victor had relied to prove its case were ruled as inapplicable to the specific complaint, and the 1908 "lateral-groove" patent originally issued to Eldridge Johnson of Victor was deemed not to have been sufficiently different from the original 1901 Jones patent. Furthermore, it was ruled that Victor had legally abandoned the patent because lateral-cut discs had been commercially produced before that date. In addition, it came to light that two British inventors had successfully patented a lateral recording process years earlier. A little more than a year later, an appeal in the Federal Circuit Court, brought by the Victor attorneys, was unsuccessful. David had defeated Goliath. Though little-noticed outside of the recording industry itself, this would have an enormous ripple effect. It would not materially affect the well-being of Victor and its ally, Columbia, who were enjoying unparalleled success in an industry not yet threatened by the advent of radio. What it would do was to open up opportunities for a myriad of small companies to enter the recording field, bringing to market new types of product to new audiences. In the process prices were reduced in many different outlets, such as mail order, department stores, and the popular five-and-dime chains. Starr, and its Gennett family of labels, would naturally share in this all-too-brief boom in phonograph record sales. But what an important share it would turn out to be! Author: Duncan Schiedt, jazz photographer and historian This article first appeared in the Starr-Gennett Foundation’s Newsletter, Volume I, Issue I, Winter 2001-2002. |
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